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The world’s leading environmental advisory institutions look to ecological theory and research as an
objective guide for policy and resource management decision-making. In addition to the theoretical and
broadly philosophical merits of doing so, it is therefore practically signiﬁcant to clear up confusions about
ecology’s conceptual foundations and to clarify the basic workings of inferential methods used in the
science. Through discussion of key moments in the genesis of the theoretical branch of ecology, this essay
elucidates a general heuristic role of teleological metaphors in ecological research and defuses certain
enduring confusions about work in ecology.
 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1 I am sympathetic to the view that many concepts employed in ecology (e.g.As ecology is the science of complex biophysical dynamics
directly relevant to environmental policy and resource manage-
ment decision-making, advisory institutions around theworld have
increasingly emphasized the guiding role the science should play in
such decision-making. Indeed, ecology is now seen as an objective
guide for “urgent political, ethical, and management decisions
about how best to live in an apparently increasingly-fragile envi-
ronment” (Colyvan, Linquist, GreyGrifﬁths, Odenbaugh, &
Possingham, 2009, p. 1).
This is reﬂected in countless regional, national, and interna-
tional directives and pieces of legislation that call to protect
ecological entities (e.g. ecosystems), their functionality (e.g. sta-
bility), and properties (e.g. biodiversity) (Donhauser, 2016). For
example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Euro-
pean Union, and National Resources Canada each emphasize ‘long-
term sustainability of ecosystems’ structure and functioning’ as an
overarching guide for all policy andmanagement strategy decision-
making (cf. Apitz, Elliott, Fountain, & Galloway, 2006; McAfee &
Malouin, 2008; McFadden & Barnes, 2009; McGinty, Pipkin, &
Gelburd, 1995). And one ﬁnds many explicit normative claims
about ecological entities in the expanding literature on mitigating
losses of human goods (e.g., agricultural species and human health
beneﬁts) due to climate change (see Donhauser, 2016). For instance,
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2013
analysis of non-economic losses lists loss of “ecosystems,”
“ecosystem services” (goods dependent on ecosystem function-
ality), and “biodiversity” (an ecosystem property), as the “main
types of non-economic losses” that will be experienced due to
climate change (UNFCC, 2013, p. 4).Explicit claims that environmental policy-makers and resource
managers should consult ecological theory as an objective guide for
decision-making are also easy to ﬁnd. For example, the EPA’s gen-
eral resource management guidelines emphatically state that ef-
forts to protect any particular natural ecosystem should be guided
by “the latest scientiﬁc understanding of the inherent properties
(i.e., patterns and processes) of that ecosystem type” (2002, p. 78).
Leading ecologists even straightforwardly promise that ecological
theory can serve as “a strong guide for environmental management
and resource conservation” (Jørgensen, 2006, p. 21).
At the same time, critics of ecology-guided policy continue to
contend that such promises ring empty and warn that advisory
organizations have been foolhardy to embrace ecological theory as
a guide for decision-makingdon the grounds that the science has
shaky philosophical foundations (see Sagoff, 2013 for recent argu-
ments). Many have questioned whether the entities described in
ecological theory exist in any meaningful sense at all (see Jordan,
1981; Sagoff, 1997; Schizas & Stamou, 2010; Sterelny, 2001;
Wittbecker, 1990).1 And numerous authors have argued that
theoretical ecological research is empirically unfounded (even
empirically unfoundable), and contend that directives that advise
looking to it for guidance in policy and management decision-
making are therefore deeply problematic (cf. Hall, 1988; Haskell,
1940; Peters, 1991; Sagoff, 2003, 2013).
Of course, ecology’s critics are right that it is advisable to
recognize the limitations of theories and research methods‘ecosystem’ and ‘community’) can, and arguably do, serve as useful and practically
valuable theoretical constructs even if they haven’t any naturally delineated ref-
erents; cf. Fitzsimmons, 1999 and O’Neill, 2001.
2 Some may complain that I have unfairly overlooked earlier works in which
ecologists seem to discuss ecological phenomena in network-based terms. For
example, Elton (1927) and Tansley (1935) both discuss ecological communities and
“systems” in terms of trophic interactions and “webs”; see Donhauser, 2016. As an
anticipatory response, I submit that substantive claims made in earlier works I
know of are roughly the same as Lindeman’s, in that they are too vague to warrant
concluding that their authors’ understood ecological entities as natural causal
networks in the way modern ecologists do. I also think there is a reasonable case to
be made that noteworthy ecologists working in the mid-1920s and 1930s (namely
Elton and Tansley), embraced more thoroughgoing antirealist views. More to the
point of my overall argument, remember also that I am here concerned with out-
lining what was done in those works that effectively “ushered in the wide-spread
acceptance of the salient network-based view”; and earlier works just didn’t do this
since the view was not generally accepted until later, in the 1940s and 50s.
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how ecological research may be useful for practical decision-
making despite them, it is also crucial to dissipate confusions
about ecology’s conceptual foundations and to clear away
misguided critiques that engage such confusions. Numerous phi-
losophers and ecologists have attempted to ﬂesh out a reasonable
metaphysics and epistemology of ecology with the aims of:
contributing to ecology itself by working toward a unifying
theoretical foundation;
exploring the implications of inferential methods used in ecol-
ogy for philosophy of science in general;
better understanding potential applications of research pro-
cesses used by ecologists;
defending the science against misguided criticisms (see, for
example, Cooper, 2007; Eliot, 2011; McIntosh,1985; Odenbaugh,
2011b; Reiners & Lockwood, 2010).
Many confusions about ecology’s philosophical foundations stem
from the absence of a straightforward narrative of the genesis and
evolution of thinking in the science. So, an approach that has been
fruitful in philosophical work on ecology has been to illuminate
conceptual innovations that brought the science to its current form
through analyses of key moments in its historical development (see
Donhauser, 2014; Golley,1993; Odenbaugh, 2007, 2011a; Ulanowicz,
1999; de Laplante & Picasso, 2011). This essay employs this jointly
historical and analytic approach to clarify certain inferential
methods used inmodern ecology and clear away a class of persisting
confusions about the science’s conceptual foundations.
In x1, I discuss major innovations in early ecologists’ thinking
about the nature of ecological entities that mark the historical
beginning ofmodern ecology. I then examine the role of teleological
characterizations in modern ecologydi.e. characterizations of
ecological populations, communities, or systems, as ‘goal-directed’
or as ‘functioning toward some goal state.’ In x2, I elucidate a
general epistemic role of such characterizations through discussion
of G. Evelyn Hutchinson’s landmark paper “Circular Causal Systems
in Ecology” (1948), which I place as the ﬁrst, and in certain ways
archetypal, theoretical research project in modern ecology. I argue
that Hutchinson (1948) does not use teleological characterizations
of ecological phenomena literally but as metaphors that aid in
developing “mechanistic,” component-to-component, accounts of
the underlying causes of observable ecological network-level dy-
namics. I support this reading by offering an operational account of
the heuristic role teleological metaphors play in the reasoning
process he employs in his landmark paper. I contend, moreover,
that ecologists have apparently followed Hutchinson, and typically
use teleological characterizations as metaphors that play heuristic
roles in advancing understanding of the underlying mechanics of
ecological network-level phenomena.
In x3, I then further defend my position and critically respond to
opposing literalist construals of teleological characterizations in
ecologydincluding arguments according to which theoretical
ecological research is unscientiﬁc, and allegedly of no value for
practical decision-making, because it is supposed to rely on teleo-
logical, “magical,” thinking (Sagoff, 2013, p. 248). I support my
contention that robust teleological views are not and have not been
embraced as a mainstream convention within ecology since
Hutchinson (1948) at least, by pointing to textual evidence showing
that ecologists have stayed on board with the idea that teleological
characterizations are not literal but instrumentally useful meta-
phors. I then show that ecologists can block claims that their
functional accounts of ecological phenomena rely on commitments
to a robust teleology by outlining a deﬂationary, etiological and
instrumentalist, view available to them. In essence, in stark contrastto a teleological metaphysics that accepts “top-down” causality, the
endorsed ‘etiological’ view sees teleological characterizations as
shorthand ways of describing the complex component-to-
component, “bottom-up” or “efﬁcient,” causes of ecological
network-level properties.1. Time-stamping the birth of modern ecology
While I cannot deny that some modern ecologists embrace
robust teleological metaphysics, I will establish that this commit-
ment is not relied on within modern theoretical ecologydas some
authors would have us believe. Since I will begin to establish this by
discussing key moments in the historical genesis of modern ecol-
ogy and the subﬁeld theoretical ecology, it is sensible to begin by
pinning down when modern ecology began. As I understand the
history of ecology, modern ecology began when, in certain well-
known works, ecologists traded ontologically robust ideas of pop-
ulations, communities, and ecosystems, for a more ontology-
neutral view according to which ecological entities are contingent
causal networks resulting from species-typical interactions be-
tween organisms and components of their shared environment(s)
(Donhauser, 2016).
Despite the fact that ecologists still use language that can easily
elicit misinterpretations of their ontological commitments, the
ecological literature shows that this more neutral viewhas been the
received view for a long time. Some authors argue that Karl August
Möbius (1877) articulated this understanding of ecological entities
as contingent causal networks in the 1800s, and others argue that
the view took root even earlier (see, for example, Shrader-Frechette
& McCoy, 1993, p. 19; Egerton, 2012; Ch. 1). I won’t make heavy
work of pinpointing the view’s exact origin or tracking its genesis,
since I wish to simply demarcate when modern ecology began by
establishing when it became a widely received view.
Inmy view, three speciﬁc articles published in the 1940s ushered
in the wide-spread acceptance of the salient network-based view,
and stimulated the growth of the theoretical branch of ecology by
demystifying the holistic (“top-down”) study of populations, com-
munities, and ecosystems. These are Raymond Lindeman’s “The
Trophic Dynamic Aspect of Ecology” (1942), A. B. Novikoff’s “The
Concept of Integrative Levels and Biology” (1945) and Hutchinson’s
“Circular Causal Systems in Ecology” (1948). I will now “time-
stamp” the birth of modern theoretical ecology by outlining what
Lindeman and Novikoff did in each of their papers to help usher in
the modern era of ecology and then explaining why I place Hutch-
inson’s paper as the ﬁrst work in modern theoretical ecology.
In essence, Lindeman (1942) ﬁrst explicitly described commu-
nity and ecosystem-level dynamics as the product of complex se-
ries of ecological interactionsdwhat he calls “physical-chemical-
biological processes”din a paper published in Science (cf. Golley,
1993; Chaps. 3 and 4).2 So, Lindeman helped popularize the net-
workedebased view simply by explicitly describing ecological
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Still, in my view, Lindeman did not do enough in the way of artic-
ulating how community and ecosystem dynamics can be produced
to count the work as having ﬁrmly established the network-based
view. Lindeman (1942) does not explain in what the “physical-
chemical-biological processes” that he claims produce network-
level dynamics can consist, but only draws correlations between
changes in environmental factors (e.g., global temperature and
nutrient levels) and changes in the relative abundances of moni-
tored populations. It is therefore difﬁcult to get much of a sense of
what Lindeman’s view was. Furthermore, explaining how the
complex processes that Lindeman describes can produce ecological
network-level properties requires a more complete theory of
biochemistry than Lindeman and most ecologists at the time were
working with.
To describe the sorts of causal interactions that can realize the
“physical-chemical-biological processes” Lindeman claimed pro-
duce community and ecosystem-level dynamics, one must explain
how trophic interactions, environmental factors, and network-
level dynamics are causally related. Although George Verdanksy
developed the central ideas of biochemistry needed to make the
relevant connections by the 1930s, they were not employed by
anyone in the ecological literature until Hutchinson used Ver-
dansky’s biochemical theory to develop accounts of community
and ecosystem mechanics after the publication of Lindeman’s pa-
per (see Hutchinson, 1979, p. 233). So while Lindeman certainly
helped popularize the network-based view, his 1942 paper cannot
be counted as marking the beginning of a new, modern, era in
ecology, because he did not describe how ecological network-level
dynamics may occur.
Though Novikoff (1945) also fails to provide a causal account of
how ecological network-level properties are produced, he made a
more signiﬁcant stride in demystifying the holistic study of
ecological networks than Lindeman, because, unlike Lindeman,
Novikoff explicitly discusses what the right metaphysics of ecology
should and should not entail. Speciﬁcally, Novikoff explains that the
network-based view does not entail commitments to broadly
‘organicist’ metaphysical theses endorsed by earlier ecologists. In
essence, according to those organicist views Novikoff rebuffs, na-
ture is supposed to be comprised of complex wholes whose con-
stituent biological parts are uniﬁed, comprise an organic whole, by
exhibiting behaviors that are coordinated to sustain vital processes
of the whole complex of them (see, for example, Clements, 1916). In
other words, earlier, organicist, ecologists attributed irreducible
causal properties to ecological networks.
Novikoff argues that there is a sensible holistic view that does
not commit one to the existence of irreducible, “emergent,” causal
properties of the networks ecologists study. He explains that this
network-based view is still holistic in the sense of taking account of
ecological network-level properties, but does not entail treating
network-level properties as causal properties of the networks
themselves that are ontologically irreducible to series of in-
teractions between their constituent parts. In his words:
Each level of organization possesses unique properties of
structure and behavior which, though dependent on the properties
of the constituent elements, appear only when these elements are
combined [to comprise networks]. Knowledge of the laws of the
lower level is necessary for a full understanding of the higher level;
yet the unique properties of phenomena at the higher level cannot
be predicted [.] from the laws of the lower level. (1945, p. 209)33 My ellipsis removes “a priori” from the quotation, as I believe it is unnecessary. I
note this because my deletion may change the content of this passage in ways
unapparent to me.Novikoff claims that taking account of “higher level” proper-
ties and regularities (“laws”) is necessary for understanding
ecological networksdperhaps even an epistemic necessity.
However, he does not endorse the idea that ecological networks
bear irreducible causal properties that coordinate the behaviors of
their component parts. In fact, in his paper, Novikoff only com-
mits to the metaphysical claim that network-level properties are
existentially dependent on those of their “constituent elements,”
and are “a consequence of [the] properties” of those elements
(ibid.). Notably, this claim is compatible with both realism and
antirealism, or “reductionism,” about individual ecological en-
tities and with both realism and antirealism about ecological
types.
Accordingly, Novikoff (1945) argues that the network-based
view is metaphysic-neutral. As he explains it, the view:
“neither reduces phenomena of a higher level to those of a lower
one, as in mechanism, nor describes the higher level in vague
non-material terms which are but substitutes for understanding,
as in [organicism]” (p., 209). The view does not “reduce phe-
nomena of a higher level,” since it has it that any actual
network-level properties can only be seen by attempting to
assess ecological networks as wholes. In my view, this is for the
simple reason that network-level properties are abstract ways of
characterizing complex series of (direct and indirect)
component-to-component causal interactions between organ-
isms (Donhauser, 2016). Such properties cannot be seen by
looking at organism-to-organism interactions, but only by
“zooming-out,” so to speak, to the network level of analysis. The
network-based view does not ‘describe the higher level in vague
non-material terms,’ like organicist holisms, as Novikoff says,
because it does not entail commitment to any speciﬁc specula-
tive views regarding the ontological reducibility or irreducibility
of ecological networks. So again, the view is neutral regarding
the (ir)reducibility of ecological networks (or, if you prefer, it’s
agnostic regarding the reality of causally operative network-level
properties).
As regards the legacy of his paper, in it, Novikoff explicitly
endorsed the network-based view, and argued that any ecological
network-level properties that may be found in nature can be best
understood by studying both component-to-component in-
teractions and ecological networks as wholes, whether or not
ecological network-level properties are causally efﬁcacious “over-
and-above” the collective efﬁcacy of their constituent parts. He
thereby effectively instated the ontologically neutral, network-
based, view as metaphysical foundation for modern ecology. For
this reason, I see Novikoff, 1945 paper as marking the beginning of
modern ecology. However, I do not consider it the ﬁrst work of
modern theoretical ecology. This is because, althoughNovikoff (1945)
effectively ushered out antiquated organicist metaphysical views
and instated the network-based metaphysical foundation for mod-
ern ecology, in his paper, he does nothing in theway of engaging any
methods characteristic of theoretical ecological research.
Indeed, as a rather short “white paper,” also published for a
general academic audience in Science, Novikoff only makes the
general points that I have just discussed and does not present any
research ﬁndings or apply or develop any research methodologies.
It was not until Hutchinson (1948) that an ecologist clearly
embraced the network-based view and also employed general
methods used in theoretical ecology (cf. Slack, 2011). Theoretical
ecological research uses “theoretical principles, metaphorical
analogies, and mathematical models” to produce and test
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structure, and emergent properties” of population, community, and
ecosystem-level networks (Sagoff, 2003, p. 531).4 Hence, what
gives Hutchinson (1948) all of the hallmarks of later theoretical
work, and distinguishes the work from earlier theoretical works, is
the combination of doing these things while also embracing the
network-based view.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the practice of using
mathematical models to characterize complex inter-organism phe-
nomena began with Hutchinson (1948). It is well known that this
practice began earlier, with the development of population models,
like Lotka-Volterra models, in the 1920s and 30s. Yet, in the sub-
stantive theoretical works pre-dating Hutchinson (1948), it is never
suggested that entities like communities and ecosystems are causal
networks to be found in nature. As these earlier theoretical works
were developed in a period of backlash against earlier organicist
conceptions of ecological entities, their authorsdmost notably
Lotka (1925), Volterra (1926), and Gause (1932)dadopted a more
extreme view than the ontologically-neutral holism that appears in
Novikoff (1945) and Hutchinson (1948) (see Cooper, 2007; Ch. 2.3).
The authors of these earlier theoretical embraced a dichotomous
outlook that arose in the early 1900s, according to which ecologists
had to either embrace organicist teleological metaphysics or alto-
gether deny the existence of ecological entities, and embrace a sort
of nihilism, in order to avoid the entailments of organicism.
Frederic Clements (1916) famously endorses the former view in
speculating that each natural ecological community is a ‘supra-
organism,’ or an “organic entity [. that] arises, grows, matures,
and dies” and has a “life-history” like an individual organism (p.16).
Henry Gleason famously endorses the competing nihilistic view in
The Individualistic Concept of the Plant Association (1917). Therein,
he explicitly rejects Clements claims and argues that populations
and communities are nothing but contingent collections of inter-
acting organisms that continually change and do not exhibit any
sort of observable network-level structure or dynamics (see
Gleason, 1917 and 1939; Odenbaugh, 2007). Those ecologists who
developed the elements of the theoretical approach that
Hutchinson (1948) builds on followed Gleason.
In fact, in their works that Hutchinson (1948) cites directly,
populations, communities, and ecosystems are never described as
naturally occurring causal networks. In these works, ‘population’ is
used as a mass term that is elliptical for ‘individuals of a species in a
place’ and there is no mention of ‘communities’ accept when
referring to “human communities” (see Lotka, 1925). Accordingly,
in the salient pre-modern theoretical works, there is no mention of
investigating natural ‘ecosystems,’ and ‘system’ is used almost
exclusively to refer to conceptual systemsdas in “abstract systems
of description” or “systems of equations” (Gause, 1932).54 I have replaced Sagoff’s use of ‘systems’ with ‘networks’ for two reasons. First,
ecologists do not always purport to investigate the properties of ecological systems,
while ecological research does consist in the more general endeavor of studying
ecological networks and their components. Second, Sagoff uses ‘ecosystem’ to refer
to ecological networks in general; rather than distinguishing populations, com-
munities, and ecosystems as different sorts of ecological networksdas I will to
preserve substantive distinctions made within ecology.
5 Lotka (1925) refers to “biological systems” in a few places and to “network[s] of
relationships that connect [.] closely living species” in one place (p. 137). However,
his overall project consists in re-conceptualizing biological phenomena in wholly
physical terms, and using mathematical models from physics to simulate small
population-scale phenomena (e.g., yeast populations) to test whether those equa-
tions can accurately predict what occurs in the selected populations. Although one
could make the case that he held a metaphysic-neutral view, the standard inter-
pretation of Lotka sees him as embracing a thoroughgoing antirealism according to
which ecological entities are nothing-but theoretical machinery; see Kingsland
(1995), p. 34.As I explain further below, Hutchinson (1948) offers functional
accounts of the series of causal interactions through which biota
and abiota can comprise ecological networks and produce dynamic
patterns observable in aggregate data on relative population and
nutrient abundances. This doesn’t appear an especially noteworthy
contribution to ecology on its own. However, viewing his work in
the historical context in which it was introduced, one can see that
Hutchinson (1948) did two key things that solidiﬁed the network-
based conceptual foundation for subsequent work in ecology and
helped facilitate the subsequent development of the theoretical
branch of ecology.
First, he gave new life to ‘community’ and ‘ecosystem’ concepts
by describing such things neither as living organic wholes nor as
mere abstract constructs, but as naturally occurring causal net-
works resultant from series of component-to-component in-
teractions between organisms and inorganic materials. By
demonstrating how seeing communities and ecosystems in this
way can facilitate better understanding of the underlying me-
chanics of observable trends in aggregated data, Hutchinson
effectively led ecologists out of the trenches of metaphysical dis-
putes about ecological entities and onto advancing knowledge
about the workings of natural ecological networks without getting
distracted by those deep metaphysical questions.6 Second, he gave
credibility to theoretical approaches to ecological research by
demonstrating, by example, how one can garner insights into the
underlying mechanics of emergent network-level dynamics
through the application of “theoretical principles, metaphorical
analogies, and mathematical models.”7
2. Hutchinson and teleological metaphor in theoretical
ecology
In this section, I ﬁrst explain in a bit more detail what Hutch-
inson does in his landmark paper, and then explain the basic ele-
ments of a still commonly used reasoning process that he
introduced therein. As the use of teleological metaphor is a key
element in that reasoning process, I close the section by offering an
operational account of the instrumental role of such metaphors in
that process.
Hutchinson (1948) basically uses teleological metaphors to help
generate accounts of the biophysical mechanics that could produce
patterns observable in aggregate data of different sorts. Speciﬁcally,
he provides accounts of the mechanics that could produce corre-
lated dynamic patterns, what he calls “oscillations,” observable in
data on nutrient resource and species abundances and data on the
Earth’s biosphere. Fig. 1 (below) depicts the sort of “observable
oscillating” to which Hutchinson refers. In this Figure, I have also
simulated the correlations between periodic changes in nutrient
and population abundance levels that are typically seen in aggre-
gated data on particular populations and nutrient resource levels
for those populations.
To generate accounts of the biophysical mechanics that could
produce correlated patterns like these, Hutchinson (1948) imagines
that the relevant patterns result from “self-regulatory” processes
within ecological networks and then conceptually constructs a
feasible series of component-to-component interactions through6 This is not to say that ecologists stopped arguing about metaphysics; they still
do. It is to say that those ecologists who followed Hutchinson, and advanced the
theoretical branch, were not preoccupied with these questions in their works.
7 Hutchinson also helped the theoretical branch of ecology grow because his
career spanned the period between the ﬁrst wave of math-based analytical ap-
proaches (in the 1920’s) and the development of the methods used in theoretical
ecological research (by the 1960’s); see Cooper (2007), Ch. 5; Fretwell (1975), p. 4;
McIntosh (1985), pp. 275e9.
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Fig. 1. Conceptual diagram of nutrient and species abundance oscillations8.
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instantiate such processes (1948, p. 237). In so doing, Hutchinson
piloted the approach of using teleological metaphors as a concep-
tual instrumentda constraining heuristic or “frame”dto aid in the
production of candidate accounts of the underlying mechanics of
network-level properties (cf. Peters, 1991, pp. 141e2).
He treated ecological networks and the biosphere as if theywere
self-regulating wholes whose constitutive parts exhibit coordi-
nated behaviors in order to conceptually reconstruct how observ-
able “cyclical” dynamics may be produced in such networks.
Unfortunately, Hutchinson does not explicitly say that this is what
he is doing in his paper, and, as is the case with much of the
contemporary ecological literature, one must take care to disen-
tangle metaphorical language from substantive descriptive claims
to correctly understand his work. Indeed, from the very start of his
paper one confronts confusing, half-metaphorical, language, as
Hutchinson explains that his understanding of ecological networks
derives from mathematician Norbert Wiener’s “cybernetic theory,”
according to which ‘it is usual to ﬁnd various teleological mecha-
nisms acting to damp oscillations’within causal networks (p. 221).9
Despite the commitments that this borrowed terminology may
suggest, careful reading shows that Hutchinson conceives of ‘tele-
ological mechanisms’ in ecological networks as series of causal
interactions that tend to keep the abundances of organisms and
their environmental resources from ﬂuctuating too extremely. In
particular, he explains that such “mechanisms” are series of
species-typical interactions that tend to keep population and
resource abundances within ranges of ﬂuctuation that allow multi-
population, community-scale, ecological networks to persistdby
maintaining an overall organism-to-resource balance that enables
their constituent populations to persist. So, according to Hutch-
inson, teleological mechanisms in ecological networks act like a
thermostat in a heating system in a certain sense, in that they have
the effect of keeping such networks from changing so drastically
they collapse (cf. Odum,1959, p. 45). Still, themechanical picture he
presents is not one in which the behaviors of the component parts
of ecological networks are somehow coordinated by an overall8 Fig. 1 is not derived from a data set, and I’ve made up the values. Still, the ﬁgure
accurately illustrates the sort of correlated dynamics between resources and species
to which Hutchinson refers. In fact, Fig. 1 is very similar to data-driven ﬁgures found
in works that Hutchinson references; in which the authors report correlations
between resource (e.g., nutrient or prey) abundances and population (e.g., plant or
predator) abundances; see, for example, Volterra (1926), Figs. I and II and Volterra
(1927), Fig. 7. See also Clarke (1954), pp. 396e9 and his Fig. 10.14.
9 Hutchinson andWiener were among several prominent ﬁgures to participate in
the Josiah Macy “Feedback Conferences” in New York in the late 1940s; see Slack
(2011), pp. 236e7. Wiener’s inﬂuential book Cybernetics, or Control and Communi-
cation in the Animal and Machine was also published in 1948din the wake of that
event. Notably, in it, Wiener explicitly abandons earlier teleological conceptions of
physical systems; Evelyn Fox Keller (2008) provides an illuminating historiography
of the abandonment of teleological thinking in science at this time.network control like a thermostat. To the contrary, he maintains
that periodic cycles in nutrient and population abundances result
from species-typical component-to-component interactions that
can be usefully described both bio-geo-chemically (“in terms of the
transfer of some substance through [a network]”) and bio-
demographically (“in terms of the variations in the numbers of
biological units or individuals”) (1948, p. 221).
Accordingly, in the ﬁrst half of the paper, Hutchinson offers
straightforward “bottom-up” accounts of series of typical bio-
physical interactions that he proposes produce carbon-cycling in
the biosphere and of series of typical interactions that he proposes
produce nutrient-cycling through ecological networks. He then
argues that these series of typical component-to-component in-
teractions are the “mechanisms” that jointly produce observable
correlated changes and oscillations in nutrient and population
abundances (1948, pp. 222e36). The latter part of Hutchinson’s
paper is also quite straightforward, though he shifts his attention to
discussing how certain theoretical population models (Lotka-Vol-
terra model variations) can be used to predict relative rates of
change in the abundances of certain sorts of interacting pop-
ulations (e.g., predator and prey). Accordingly, he concludes the
paper by outlining how such models might be combined to
generate useful community-scale models (1948, pp. 238-42).
To get back to the main narrative of this paper, I will leave my
summary of Hutchinson’s paper at that, and now turn to clarifying
how teleological characterizations help ecologists better under-
stand ecological phenomena. As I have said, I will do this by offering
an account of the heuristic role that teleological metaphors play in
the reasoning process that Hutchinson employed in his project and
that ecologists commonly employ to date. That role of teleological
metaphors in reasoning in ecology is brought into focus by looking
at the role such metaphors play in sciences other than ecology.
Consider, for example, geophysicists descriptions of how
riverbed structure typically evolves due to erosion fromwater ﬂow
as a bed’s sediment material organizing so as to minimize the en-
ergy available to deform it by introducing resistance to ﬂow (see, for
instance, Eaton, Church, & Davies, 2006; Church, Hassan, &Wolcott,
1998). As another example, consider chemists’ descriptions of
atoms of different types electrostatically attracting and repelling
each other or their characterizations of the behaviors of aggregates
of atoms in general as such aggregates always seeking “energetically
favorable” combinations. Characterizations like these are to be
interpreted metaphorically, because although they look as if they
explain why the behaviors they are used to characterize occur
prima facie, that information is not provided by such characteriza-
tions. Geophysicists are not saying that the sediment comprising a
riverbed organizes as it does because that sediment particle
network has a goal to resist erosive forces. Likewise, chemists do
not claim that aggregates of atoms organize as they do because they
literally intentionally seek stable combinations. The teleological
10 I say that Sagoff, 2013 target article is “popular” on the grounds that it is listed
as the “most read” article on the publisher’s main page (with over two-thousand
reported views) and is cited in numerous independent published works.
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explanatory.
Rather, such metaphors aid in the process of understanding
phenomena that are somewhat difﬁcult to grasp by allowing them
to be seen as similar to phenomena that are comparatively more
familiar and therefore easier to understand. Accordingly, teleolog-
ically-charged notions like ‘resistance,’ ‘attraction,’ ‘chasing,’ and
‘organizing’ are useful metaphors because they help characterize
the ﬂow of causal processes that are relatively difﬁcult to under-
stand, and thereby aid scientists in generating causal accounts of
how network-level dynamics occur. To illustrate how such meta-
phors do this, consider the following description of how salt (a
network of sodium and chlorine atoms) dissolves in water, pre-
sented by Marc Lange. Lange says:
The crystal lattice of sodium chloride [salt] is held together by
very strong electrostatic attractions between alternating positively
charged (sodium) and negative charged (chlorine) ions. In water,
crystalline sodium chloride dissolves into individual sodium and
chloride ions because the attraction between Na and Cl is greatly
exceeded by the electrostatic attraction between Na and the
partially negatively charged oxygen atom of a water molecule, and
between Cl and one of the positively charged hydrogen atoms of the
water molecule. Water molecules are therefore able to insert
themselves between these ions; the energy needed to separate a Na
atom from a Cl atom is more than provided by the energy released
when bonds form between water molecules and these ions. (1994,
p. 115).
In this passage, the teleological phrases indicate how, not why,
the nodes in such atomic networks behave as they do. They are
metaphorical, not unlike describing how individual clouds behave
relative to one another by saying they “chase each other” or “dance
together” across the sky (Nissen, 1983, p. 155). By helping one
envision how the atoms comprising salt and water behave relative
to one another to produce salt’s dissolution, the metaphorical ele-
ments of characterizations like Lange’s aid one, heuristically, in
formulating a conceptual picture of the mechanics of how salt
dissolves in water. I submit that Hutchinson’s “teleological mech-
anisms,” and more common talk of “self-regulation” and “self-or-
ganization” in ecology, also serve as heuristically useful metaphors,
by outlining, in a cursory way, how the nodes in ecological net-
works must behave relative to each other to produce observable
network-level properties.
Hutchinson’s “teleological,” “self-regulatory,” mechanisms that
“dampen oscillations” in population and nutrient abundances, are
metaphors that helped him generate the component-to-
component accounts of the series of interactions that could plau-
sibly produce the observable correlated oscillations he sought to
explain. Just as seeing atoms as attracting each other or clouds as
chasing each other can be helpful, metaphors like ‘self-regulation’
are helpful by limiting the possibilities concerning what may serve
as a plausible component-to-component account capable of
explaining away the teleological content of such characterizations.
Accordingly, these metaphors appear to serve constraining, heu-
ristic, roles in Hutchinson’s project by dictating that a plausible
account of the underlying mechanics of observable oscillations in
nutrient and population abundances must have organisms and
their resource materials, the nodes in the networks that produce
those oscillations, behaving in ways whereby they could collec-
tively produce such patterned network-level dynamics. By
providing accounts that ﬁt this billdhis “biochemical” and “bio-
demographic” explanations of how observable oscillations in
nutrient and population abundances are produceddHutchinson
(1948) effectively provides a way to explain away the teleological
content of the metaphors he employs. His project at once shows
how envisioning ecological networks as if they are self-regulatingsystems can help advance understanding of the inner workings of
such networks, and exempliﬁes a general process of reasoning with
teleological metaphors that is still commonly employed in
ecological research.3. Ecology as etiological, not teleological, in its metaphysics
There has been a historied debate about whether ecology is
ultimately undergirded by a teleological metaphysics in ecology
and the philosophy thereof (de Laplante & Picasso, 2011 provide a
nice overview). For different reasons, some continue to urge that
teleological characterizations of ecological phenomena are either
best understood literally or somehow rely on unshakable teleo-
logical metaphysical commitments (see, e.g., Goldsmith, 2008; Jax,
Jones, & Pickett, 1998, pp. 253e264; Sagoff, 2013; Shrader-
Frechette, 1986; Voûte, 1968; Worster, 1990). And, as I have said,
some ecologists do in fact appear towholeheartedly endorse robust
teleological views. Though it is usually hard to tell how seriously
committed individual ecologists may be, it is undeniable that
ostensible commitments to teleological views are preserved
through continued use of descriptions of natural ecosystems as
exhibiting “self-organizing” tendencies and “top-down control”
constraints that are said to partially determine the properties of
their component parts (e.g., organism behaviors and traits) (see
Sole & Bascompte, 2006). There are also enduring criticisms of
ecology that engage a literalist construal of ecologists’ teleological
characterizations.
Numerous critiques presume that ecologists generally embrace
a sort of “naïve positivism” and purport to provide literal charac-
terizations of natural kinds of ecological phenomena (Shrader-
Frechette & McCoy, 1993, p. 149; cf. Peters, 1991; Ch. 5; Sagoff,
2003, p. 532; Simberloff, 1980, pp. 23e5). Certain, more speciﬁc,
critiques engage a literalist interpretation according to which a
wellspring of alleged problems for ecologists is that they cannot
“ﬁnd a source for the teleology that [allegedly] underwrites [their]
functional accounts” of ecological phenomena (Cooper, 2007, p.
282). For example, lauded environmental philosopher Mark Sagoff
has employed a literalist interpretation of teleological character-
izations to motivate claims that theoretical ecological research is
unscientiﬁc and of no use for practical decision-making (see Sagoff,
1997; 2000; 2013). In a recent popular article, he contends that
much work in ecology is unscientiﬁc because modern ecologists
still rely on some form of Clementian organicism (discussed above
in x1).10 Speciﬁcally, Sagoff alleges that ecologists rely on the claim
that properties of ecological networks and their component parts
are caused by some essential network-level telos or ‘directed self-
organizing capabilities.’ And he argues that because there is, in
his words, “magical thinking behind the idea that ecosystems are
[. self-organizing] systems,” ecologists cannot empirically sub-
stantiate that theories and models that characterize natural eco-
systems are useful for characterizing any particular things in nature
(Sagoff, 2013, p. 248 see also Sagoff, 1997, pp. 960e3, 891e3).
While I agree that there is no reason to think that ecological
networks have properties that coordinate the behaviors of their
component parts, I believe most modern ecologists would agree as
well and submit that literalist construals of most teleological
characterizations found in modern ecological research are
misguided. I have offered support for this claim already by
recounting how ecologists traded robust ontological positions for
an ontology-neutral one, according to which population,
11 The endorsed etiological view, which sees teleological claims as metaphorical
characterizations of component-to-component causal processes, may also provide
resources for extending an alternative to views that attempt to “naturalize” claims
about teleological functions. Thought I am here unjustlly distilling views of this
latter sort, they essentially claim that biological entities exhibit certain properties
because they have “traits” (some type of composition) that has been designed for
realizing said properties by evolutionary processes; see Bedau (1991) for discussion.
At pesent, I am unsure to what extent the view I am endorsing can be reasonably
extended to make sense of biological functions. I offer this note in an attempt to
block confusions that may be triggered by my use of ‘etiological,’ which is a term
used in the philosophical literature on “naturalizing teleological functions” that
does not carry the same meaning there as it does in my discussion above.
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ing from contingent species-typical interactions, by the mid-1940s.
I’ve also challenged the idea that modern ecologists rely on teleo-
logical metaphysics by arguing that Hutchinson did not do this even
in the ﬁrst, and in important ways archetypical, project in modern
theoretical ecology; as well as by further arguing that ecologists
routinely use teleological metaphors to aid in generating
component-to-component accounts of the mechanics of ecological
network-level dynamics following Hutchinson.
Since my story so far leaves off in 1948, with Hutchinson’s
project, one might well retort that ecologists could have system-
atically misinterpreted Hutchinson since the 1950s, forgotten about
his metaphorical usage of teleological characterizations, or just
plain reclaimed the robust teleological thinking of earlier ecolo-
gists. Notably, however, there is textual evidence showing that this
apparently did not occur, and that, in general, ecologists have
stayed on board with the idea that teleological characterizations of
ecological phenomena are non-literal.
For one thing, the literature shows today’s ecologists typically
identifying bona ﬁde teleological causes only at the level of indi-
vidual organisms. Speciﬁcally, it shows that they appear to see such
causes playing an operative role in bringing about ecological
network-level properties only via the intentional reproductive and
survival behaviors of individual organisms (cf. Irwin, 2015, pp. 317e
8; cf.; McShea, 2012). Since the most basic causally operative nodes
in the networks they study are organisms, ecologists naturally take
note of teleological causes when taking account of certain behav-
iors of particular organism(s). For instance, a wolf has a goal that
determines its behavior when it preys upon deer, and explanations
or predictions that account for individual wolf behaviors, or even
pack behaviors, may therefore in some sense take account of the
causal impacts of such goals. Yet, acknowledging that any organism
may contribute to a series of ecological interactions that inﬂuence
population, community, or ecosystem-level dynamics with some of
its goal-directed behaviors in no way implies that the behaviors of
individual organisms are also coordinated by some telos belonging
to the ecological networks in which they are nodes (see Peacock,
2011, p. 235). Accordingly, I think most ecologists would agree
that teleological causes are apparently operative only at the or-
ganism level of analysis (where one ﬁnds individuals with in-
tentions). As Peter Richerson says:
Natural selection is the most basic ecological process because it
appears to be the only mechanism directly responsible for goal-
directed behavior on the part of biological organisms. In the past,
ecologists have often carelessly attributed goal-seeking behavior to
various levels of organization in what might now be characterized
as ‘fallacies of misplaced teleology.’ (1977, p. 3).
The literature also shows that ecologists have tended to shy
away from committing to any robust metaphysics at all. Numerous
ecologists have defended antirealist positions, and numerous au-
thors argue that a thoroughgoing antirealism has been the pre-
vailing paradigm within ecology for several decades (see Botkin,
1990; Fitzsimmons, 1999; Wittbecker, 1990). More generally, ecol-
ogists have shifted away from reifying descriptions of populations,
communities, and ecosystems in the contemporary literature, to-
ward talk of abstract ‘levels of analysis.’ In line with this shift, one
often ﬁnds descriptions of ecological research as consisting in doing
“network analyses” and investigating “network pathways,” or se-
ries of stochastic interactions between organisms and aspects of
their environment(s), that produce patterns observable at different
network-levels of analysis (see Allesina & Bondavalli, 2004;
Donhauser, 2016; Patten, 2010; Scharler and Baird, 2005;
Ulanowicz, 2011). Prima facie robust teleological characterizations
like the ‘interconnection of everything to everything else’ and ‘self-
organization’ are considered accordingly as, “semantic constructsfor describing the subtle and yet complex nature of eco [logical
networks]” (Gattie et al., 2006, p. 162; see also the sources cited
therein). In other words, such characterizations are typically seen
as useful ways of describing dynamic trends and patterns seen from
a zoomed out, network-level, perspectivedor ways of outlining
“very general events [that] are only seen [.] with rather blurred
vision” as Robert MacArthur once said (1968, p. 159).
While much loose teleological language is undoubtedly very
common in the ecological literature, one simply does not ﬁnd ev-
idence of a general shift back to serious commitments to a robust
teleology. The burden is therefore on those who claim that modern
ecologists’ rely on teleological metaphysics, or any sort of “magical
thinking,” to provide anything but misinterpreted metaphors to
uphold their critiques. To do more than just ofﬂoading the burden
of proof, I will now show that ecologists needn’t rely on such
commitments by outlining a viable deﬂationary, etiological and
instrumentalist, view available to them. More speciﬁcally, I will
establish this by now sketching three lines of argument ecologists
can use to defuse claims that their teleological characterizations
commit them to a teleological metaphysics.
My primary suggestion is that they can defuse such claims by
explicitly embracing what I call an ‘etiological’ view of teleology. As
I said in the introduction, this etiological view sees teleological
characterizations as shorthand ways of describing the component-
to-component underlying causes of ecological network-level
properties. Whereas the robust teleological metaphysics some
mistakenly attribute to ecologists assumes that some properties of
ecological networks and their component parts are caused, “top-
down,” by a network’s tendency to evolve toward some future state,
an etiological metaphysics assumes that all properties are caused
by component-to-component, “bottom-up,” interactions. This
view, which I believe is in fact generally received by modern
ecologists, then effectively reduces teleological explanations to
efﬁcient causal explanations; in stark contrast to a teleological
metaphysics that counts teleological explanations as genuine
causal explanations that are somehow irreducible to efﬁcient
causal explanations.11
More speciﬁcally, I submit that teleological characterizations
reduce to the following form according to the etiological under-
standing I am endorsing. They say that for any instance of some
type of ecological network, N: ‘any N has the function of doing P
just in case an N is present as a result of causing P’ (cf. Papineau,
1992, pp. 61e7; Wright, 1976; Ch. 3). Consider, for example, the
characterization according to which an ecosystem is ‘an ecological
network that functions to maximize energy available for work
within its boundaries to the extent permitted by energy inputs to
that network’ (see Mitsch & Jørgensen, 2004, p. 92; Zhang, Gurkan,
& Jorgensen, 2010, p. 695). This is to say that an ecosystem is pre-
sent just in case an ecological network is functioning as such, and
that that ecosystem persists just as long as that network continues
to function that way. This etiological way of interpreting teleolog-
ical characterizations of ecosystems does not require that one refer
to any teleological cause of the dynamics of any such networks.
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function to maximize exergy’ as telling one what an ecological
network will do if it qualiﬁes as an ecosystem, not why or how it
may do it.
According to this etiological understanding, to say that a
particular ecological network is an ecosystem because it exhibits
exergy-maximizing dynamics is not to say that this fact explains
why or how said network does so. It is just to say that the
component parts of that network are, for the duration of that time
they constitute an ecosystem, exhibiting patterns of behavior
relative to each other such that they effectively maximize exergy
within the boundaries of that network (whyever, however, and for
whatever period of time they do so) (cf. Patten & Odum, 1981, p.
889). Explicitly endorsing this etiological understanding of teleo-
logical characterizations, which I submit is at work in the back-
ground of contemporary work in ecology, would go a long way
toward defusing allegations that ecologists still harbor commit-
ments to antiquated teleological views.
Another way ecologists can effectively undermine claims that
they embrace a teleological metaphysics is by more consistently
noting that the “mechanisms” that produce ecological network-
level dynamics are identical to those operative in processes of
natural selection. For example, it should be made clearer in the
literature in ecology that processes of natural selection produce
changes in the composition of ecological networks such that they
exhibit network-level dynamics whose trajectories are aptly out-
lined with certain teleological characterizations. Consider, for
instance, how processes of natural selection might change the
composition of a community comprised of different plant species. A
species, X, suited to growing well given an abundant supply of
certain nutrients will do so and will therefore out-compete other
species that are less well suited to growing in those same condi-
tions. Accordingly, if relative nutrient resource abundances change
substantially, species-X would likely be supplanted by a species, Y,
that is better suited to thriving in the new conditions. In this way, at
least some community-scale plant networks do in fact “maximize
useable energy” within their boundaries through processes
whereby the most ﬁt species always win the daydsuch that these
communities always produce what can be described as an
“optimal” amount of biomass by changing in their overall compo-
sition in response to changing network inputs. So, it just makes
sense that the dynamics of any such network will be aptly char-
acterized by saying that that network will exhibit compositional
and structural changes in such a way that it will tend to maximize
useable energy within its boundaries to the extent permitted by
environmental constraints.12 Clearly explaining such things in the
ecological literature would, at least, serve to make it clearer that
ecologists’ teleological characterizations are non-literal, and non-
causal, and can be re-cast in component-to-component terms
(see Barker, 1993).
Finally, and perhaps obviously, ecologists can also resist claims
that they embrace a teleological metaphysics by explicitly
committing to an ‘instrumentalist’ epistemology, according to
which characterizations of ecological phenomena are essentially
conceptual instruments whose value primarily depends on
whether (and how well) they aid in understanding and predicting
things about natural phenomenadregardless of whether they are12 One should also expect observable population abundance “oscillations” (as
shown in Fig. 1 above) in ecological networks in which nutrient levels change in
periodic cycles (due to seasonal weather conditions, for instance). Though it is
important to note as well that, given the potential impacts of many contingent
factors, one should also expect to see ecological networks whose dynamics are not
aptly characterized as “energy maximizing” or “oscillating.”true. This is not to suggest that commitment to an instrumentalist
epistemology is implied by committing to the view that teleological
characterizations are metaphorical. Indeed, one can maintain that
characterizations of ecological networks are metaphorical and
consistently maintain that they also, at least partially, accurately
describe natural phenomena. My point is simply that instrumen-
talism is a tenable epistemology available to ecologists that is
neutral with respect to matters of metaphysics. Hence, ecologists
can also deﬂect claims that their teleological characterizations are
literal by explicitly endorsing a form of instrumentalism.
Worse for thosewho claim ecologists embrace any sort of robust
metaphysics, as a matter of fact, instrumentalism appears to be the
working epistemology of very many projects in ecology. The ex-
press purpose of a large number of archetypal theoretical projects
in ecology is developing maximally simpliﬁed and predictively
powerful principles and modelsdwithout concern for whether
those, often patently false models, accurately represent things as
they are in nature (Donhauser, 2014; see also,; Levins, 1966;;
Odenbaugh, 2005). And sincemuch current work in ecology aims to
address environmental problems, is therefore solution-oriented
and pragmatically driven, and increasingly “occurs in a volatile
juncture between science and politics,” one should expect that
ecologists would naturally embrace broadly instrumentalist views
(Odenbaugh, 2010, p. 155). For that matter, many would urge that
ecological research is not, and perhaps has never been, geared to-
ward developing literally true theories and models at all. In fact,
numerous authors contend that the entire enterprise of ecology is
best understood as an endless pragmatic effort to: posit new hy-
potheses that become relevant to public policy and resource
management as the environment continually changes; anticipate
novel environmental problems; and explore the potential ramiﬁ-
cations of alternative responses to potential problems (cf. Holling,
1995, p. 4; Mitchell, 2009, p. 99; Rist, Campbell, & Frost, 2013).
4. Conclusion
I have sought to push forward the philosophical and broader
crossdisciplinary dialogue about ecology’s scientiﬁc and practical
value by clearing away some persisting confusions about the sci-
ence’s philosophical foundations. To take stock, I have done this by:
 tracking early ecologists’ shift away from teleological meta-
physics, and explaining the conceptual innovations that marked
the beginning of modern theoretical ecology;
 offering an operational account of the heuristic role of teleo-
logical metaphors in certain general reasoning processes
employed in theoretical ecological research (after Hutchinson,
1948);
 challenging enduring literalist construals of teleological char-
acterizations employed in ecology;
 showing that ecologists needn’t rely on robust teleological
commitments by outlining etiological and instrumentalist views
as viable alternatives.
Of course, there remains much work to be done to glean further
insights into ecology’s foundations, inferential methods, and value.
For example, though I have limited my attention to examining how
we should understand teleological language in ecology, I believe
the etiological view that I have outlined bears signiﬁcant implica-
tions for concerns about ecologist’s delineations of natural kinds of
ecological phenomena. There is also interesting philosophical work
to do on the implications of ecological research for general meta-
physics and epistemology of science; as well as important practical
work to do on clarifying applications of various ecological research
methods for policy and resource management decision-making. It
J. Donhauser / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 60 (2016) 67e76 75is my sincere hope that my arguments in this essay will inspire
further philosophical work on ecology, and that others interested in
ecology and its applications ﬁnd resources in it to extend their own
investigations.
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